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SOIne Approaches to
Anguish in Pre-1950
French Literature
by George

J.

McKenzie, S.M., Ph.D.

For sometime now, we have not heard much about the" anguished generation. " Our
newspapers and magazines are busy recording the deeds-whatever we may think of
them-of the anguished generation rather than the basic motive that prompts them .
It is safe to assert, however, that anguish is still very much with us. There are numerous factors at work generating it. There is the threat of atomic warfare, which
according to Secretary of Defense McNamara could wipe out most of the American
people, and on the other hand, a perhaps even greater number of the enemy. Again
whole sections of cities have recently burst into resentful and destructive orgies to
dramatize the intolerable situation resulting from the poverty and the frustration that
plague them. Negro marches and demonstrations for Civil Rights are rolling on in
gigantic volume. Taxes are lowered then raised again; the price of living has skyrocketed to unprecedented heights. Draft calls are increasing and protests against
governmental action both domestic and foreign are on the increase. There are continued attacks on established authority. Some are espousing radical causes of the
right, others of the left, in an effort to satisfy their desire for personal security.
All these phenomena are only so many facets of the moral anguish that continues to gnaw at the vitals of contemporary SOCiety.
Now, anguish is nothing new and its presence in the world is commensurate
with the history of mankind. Perhaps it has come to the fore in our day because
men by and large have tended to take for granted the implications of Nietzsche when
he said that God is dead.
It is interesting to see how modern man has tangled with this crushing problem.
In this paper I should like to present a brief picture of how some twentieth century
French novelists and playwrights have dealt with this same problem. Two centers of
feeling and thought are clearly discernible: the existentialist and the Christian.
But before going into detail on this pOint, it might be well to establish a workable definition of the term anguish. Webster 's new International Dictionary states that
the word anguish is derived from the Latin angustia which means narrowness, and
in the plural, straits or distress. More popularly anguish is defined as an agonizing
1
or excruciating pain of mind or body; again it may be acute suffering or distress.
Webster 's N ew Intenuztional Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed.; Springfield , M assachusetls:
G. & C. Merriam Company, 1960 ), p. 104.

Published by eCommons, 1966

1
31

University of Dayton Review, Vol. 3 [1966], No. 1, Art. 3
A dictionary definition does not of course exhaustively characterize the concept of
anguish since in the philosophy of Kierkegaard and his followers, as well as in that
of St. Augustine, and French Catholic writers like Georges Bernanos, who follows the
Augustinian tradition, and who in this paper will represent the Catholic approach to
anguish, this term suggests many additional overtones.
To begin with, the years just before and after World War II witnessed the
growing popularity of the existentialist philosophy. This school of speculation, veering from the contemplation of pure essences, turned its attention to the concrete, the
dispossessed, the estranged or the problematical man, one of whose main afflictions
is anguish of spirit. These philosophers naturally found food for thought in the writings of S¢en Kierkegaard.
With Kierkegaard, an important forerunner of modern EXistentialism, anguish,
which he equates with dread, emerges as a paramount issue. He is careful to make
it clear that anguish differs from fear; for fear arises from disturbance in the presence of a perceived menacing object, whereas anguish or dread is a fear of oneself,
a fear of nothingness.
The follOWing quotation summarizes the previous assertions and simultaneously
stresses the role of freedom which plays such a prominent part in later existentialists
like Andre Malraux and Jean-Paul Sartre:
One almost never sees the concept dread dealt with in psychology, and
I must therefore call attention to the fact that it is different from fear
and similar concepts which refer to something definite, whereas dread
is freedom 's reality as possibility for possibility. One does not therefore
find dread in the beast, precisely for the reason that by nature the beast
is not qualified by spirit. 2
Kierkegaard then explains the mechanics of dread. In the first place it is not incompatible with innocence; for before the dawn of experience of any kind, man is innocent
of soul. It is then the spirit dreaming that projects a kind of non-ego the presence of
which immediately produces dread or angUish. Kierkegaard explainS:
In this state there is peace and repose; but at the same time there is
something different, which is not dissension and strife, for there is nothing
to strive with. What is it then? Nothing. But what effect does nothing produce? It begets dread. This is the profound secret of innocence, that at
the same time it is dread. Dreamingly the spirit projects its own reality,
but this reality is nothing, but this nothing constantly sees innocence outside of it. 3
2 Soren Kierkegaard, Th e Concept
1947), p. 38.

3

0/

D read, trans. Walter Lowrie ( Princeton: Princeton University Press,

Ib id.
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In all existentialist philosophies anguish cannot be rationally understood or explained.
The object of this anguish cannot be named or sharply defined; for if it could, man
might defend himself, obviate the danger that threatens him, and once again arrive
at security. As one modern philosopher put it:
In existential anguish man's relationship to the world is totally shaken
and becomes wholly questionable. Something utterly mysterious intervenes between hinl and the familiar objects of his world, between him
and his fellowmen, between him and all his "values." Everything which
he had called his own pales and sinks away, so that there is nothing
left to which he might cling. What threatens is "nothing" (no thing),
and he finds himself alone and lost in the void. But when this dark and
terrible night of anguish has passed, man breathes a sigh of relief and
tells himself: it was "nothing" after all. He has experienced nothingness. 4
For Kierkegaard, then, what constitutes the object of nothingness is the nothingness of the non-ego; for Sartre, l'en-soi. It is the Dane's contention that anguish
and nothingness are correlative. AngUish, accordingly, is the effect of experiencing
nothingness; and with Heidegger, anguish excites man from the false quiet of his
every day life and leaves him free to accomplish his existential tasks. Here, again,
the role of freedom in self-determination is underscored. Thus angUish becomes the
expression of the perfectibility of human nature. It does away with false security and
gives man over to that complete abandonment in which" authentic existence" originates. In passing through angUish, man, according to the existentialist, attains to a
new kind of security, "a hold in the infinite," as Jaspers put it. 5
But before man reaches this stage of security, he must undergo a period of
estrangement from a hostile Objective world. The non-ego, as it were, besieges the ego
which, bolstered by technology and science, had originally felt itself to be the conqueror and master of material things. Now, on the contrary, after so many wars,
revolutions and economic disasters, man witnesses the hostility of the non-ego against
the ego, and this aggreSSion fills him with trepidation and fear. As Reinhardt says,
man
faces the "totally other" which calls in question himself, his thinking,
his dOing, and his "values." "Being-in-itselP' begins to oppress him
like a nightmare, seizing and enveloping him with an iron grip. The
constructs of abstract rational thought are tumbling. 6

4

Kurt F. Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1952), p. 235.

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid., p. 233.
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Because everything that he has held sacred until now seems to vanish into thin air,
man views the universe, or the non-ego, as an absurd entity. A contemporary philosopher of Christian existentialism, after describing the sad resignation that characterizes the facial features of this dispossessed creature, who once enjoyed the
friendship of a wife, children, parents and neighbors; who formerly owned a house
and land and the wherewith of a livelihood, has emerged from the ravages of World
War II looking very much like The Man With A Hoe:
... 11 parle peu, toujours lentement, avec retenue. 11 parle de ce qu'il
a possooe naguere, des siens, de sa ferme, et par la il redevient un ~tre
humain au presen~ bientet il retombe dans son mutisme. Mais auparavant il a pose une question, toujours la meme, et il ne s'attend certes
pas It obtenir une reponse: "Qui sUis-je? demande-t-il, pourquoi est-ce
que je vis, et quel sens a tout cela?" 7
Marcel here points up the confusion and despair of the man who has suffered total
deprivation as a result of the war. Such a man has experienced the existential absurdity of life to the very dregs. Before him the universe seems to remain silent when
with anguish he ponders the question: "Who am I? Why am I alive?" The hostility
of the non-ego is all too evident here.
The estranged man of existentialism is the full-flowering of the hunted hero that
gradually appeared in French literature even before the outbreak of World War II.
The genesis of this hero deserves a brief word of explanation. His appearance in the
novel is bound up with the gradual manifestation of a new literary climate.
The generation of writers that sprang up after World War I came into a heritage of emancipation partially prepared by Andre Gide, Charles Peguy and Henri
Bergson. This is the period that marks the opening of the "Roaring Twenties."
Bergson's part in the new age is more significant than usually thought; for it was
Peguy who saw in this philosopher of the elan vital a modern champion who dealt
mortal blows to those mythical giants of the nineteenth century: positivism, materialism and determinism. Loosed from the fetters of the old ideologies that had supposedly set restraints on the human spirit, the new generation, still bewildered by its
inheritance of broad freedom, experienced a Siege of frustration at the ineptitude of
society to challenge adequately the raw strength and the ambitions it felt surging
wildly within itself. The literary firmament of those times flashes with countless pyrotechniCS; there is evident an unmistakable taste for things, for life lived to the hilt,
for the ecstasy of the actual moment. Yet through it all runs a thread of disturbance,
of anxiety, manifested in such works as Les en/ants terribles by Jean Cocteau, Le
diable au corps by Radiguet, or Etienne by Marcel Arland. 8
7

Gabriel Marcel, L 'Homme problematique ("Editions Montaigne;" PariS: Aubier, 1955), p. 12.

8

R. M. Alberes, Bilan liiteraire du

xx siecle ("Editions Montaigne;" Paris:
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Toward the close of the decade, writers begin to view liberty as something more
than a gratuitous act exercised in a meaningless void; it turns into a sense of responsibility aroused by the existence of dictators, or any ism that looms as a threat
to individual freedom. 9 It is at this point, in fact, that Andre Malraux's heroes
appear on the scene. They will view with contempt the noisy, pointless fanfare and
dissipation of their i m m e d i ate predecessors; they will pass anew into the pitiless,
scorching rays of self-appraisal to arrive at an even greater degree of authentic sincerity; they will, finally, burst the shackles of social routine to tangle unprotected
with the awesome, forbidding monster of their personal destiny. One modern critic
viewing the problem from the standpOint of a refusal of spineless conformity says:

I.e refus de la vie donne, que ce soit socialement ou moralement( ... ),
aiguille l'homme sur une serie de solutions nouvelles du probleme de
sa nature et de sa fin. 10
A new courage seems to make its presence felt; the threat to personal freedom launched
by the dictators will not go unchallenged.
Since nothing must now intervene between man and his courage, between the
harshness of the world and the human will, adventure fraught with danger is best
calculated to bring out the best that is in man. This adventure, too, is a form of
solitude favorable to meditation, a situation that permits man to return to the very
roots of his inner being:
Dans la solitude et dans Ie peril se devoile alors la condition humaine,
la verite essentielle de l'homme que l'homme du commun ne voit se devoiler que lorsqu 'un drame Ie frappe et Ie fait tressaillir. 11
Herein lies the asceticism of the new sincerity· for its adherents find an opportunity
for meditation on death in the very bosom of violent action and perilous risks. In
the face of death, moreover, an idea, according to these novelists, falls into clearer
focus; and the fruit of this inSight is a new strength to resist death itself or any form
of personal degradation. Reinhardt explains the matter as follows:
In the vertigo of the "fear of death" man is overcome by the dreadful
thought of "being-no-more" and it is this experience which reveals to
him the final and total threat to which his existence is exposed. But this
fear of total annihilation may also have a very salutary effect: in existential perseverance in the face of the certainty of death man may reach
9

Ibid, p. 68.

10 Andre Breton, "I.e merveilleux contre Ie mystere," Minotaure, IX (mars, 1950), p. 25.

11 Alberes, p. 89.
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an absolute " hold" beyond time and death. By forcing man to ask himself as to what is absolutely essential in his existence and by making him
free and resolute in his action, death becomes the final challenge and
supreme test of existence. 12
The " adventure" requires that the hero be put in circumstances that are harrowing and even vile to allow him to see his ideals through to the very end . Kierkegaard
himself implies this when he says of anguish:

If we observe children, we find this dread more definitely indicated as a
13
seeking after adventure, a thirst for the prodigiOUS, the mysterious.
Anouilh's Antigone expresses this very thought: " Nous sommes ceux qui posent les
questions jusqu 'au bout"; 14 and a writer in wishing to see things through to the
end is perforce constrained to push evil, ugliness, horror and even weakness to their
limits to see what lies beyond them. This experience of the heroes going to the very
end of things is in reality their despair, their angUish. To borrow a term from Mystical Theology, this " dark night" of the hero is the only means whereby he may be
free; for according to Sartre, hope begins on the other side of despair. 15
A universe, of course, that puts a man to such a rugged test, must, in the existentialist conception of things, be " absurd ." This divorce between man and his own
life, between an actor and the setting of the stage upon which he must act-such disproportion constitutes in fact the very essence of the "absurd." 16 The" absurd"
and the " despair" of the existentialist writers, it should be noted, are not just an
attitude of complacency in pessimism. Rather do they tend to point up the distance
between man 's aspirations and the conditions in which he lives, or as Camus puts it:
... ce divorce entre I 'esprit qui desire et Ie monde qui decoit, ma nostalgie d 'unite, cet univers disperse et la contradiction qUi les enchatne. 17
The representation of man 's miseries and misfortunes in existentialist literature is a
preliminary step to their exordsm; for it is not, as a matter of fact, man's defeat
that is admirable, but rather the winning back, the possession by the writer of man 's
destiny. 18 It is only by getting a thorough knowledge and appredation of his mis12 Reinhardt, p. 240.
13 Kierkegaard, p. 38.
14 Jean Anouilh, " Antigone," No uvelles pieces nOires, (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1946 ), p. 193.
15 Jean·Paul Sartre, " Les mouches," TMfltre( Parls: Gallim ard , Copyright 1947), p. 102.
16 Albert Camus, Le My the de Sisyphe, (PariS: Gallimard, Copyright 1942 ), p. 35.
17 Ib id., p. 71.

18 Andre Malraux , Les voix du silence (Paris: La Galerie de la Ple!ade, 1951), p. 74.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol3/iss1/3
36

6

McKenzie: Some Approaches to Anguish in Pre-1950 French Literature
erable condition that man can, according to Sartre, attain to true liberty. 19 And
from liberty won in this manner, a man becomes truly responsible. With Malraux,
the heroes will therefore oppose everything that tends in life to nullify man: death,
suffering, humiliation; with Camus, they will accept the fatality of man's misery but
do their utmost to ameliorate the condition of human existence; with Sartre, they will
do very nearly the same while exulting in their freedom, their solitude and their indiViduality like Orestes in Les M ouches.
The characters of the atheistic existentialists, then, are quite different from the
traditional types of realistic literature who make their way through life amid sentimental adventures and psychological reactions. The Tchens, the Perkens, and the
Hugos, characters in existentialist literature, are bent on reaching a state of soul
which transcends material actions to put them face to face with an absolute-for
them a point of no re.turn. The way for them lies through the sordid, the base, the
cruel and even death. The last step is the most Significant of all, for it is at the same
time their justification and their defeat: their justification, for it is the last point of
witness to the greatness of their actions; their defeat, for the glory that it offers, dies
with the heroes since only they, while they are yet alive, can offer this justification
of their deeds. This is the tragiC element that frustrates the existentialist hero, but
which does not prevent him from seeing it through to the end. This fate is alike his
anguish and his hope.
Now, representing the Christian outlook on anguish, where does Georges Bernanos fit into the picture so far delineated? From a first reading of his novels, the
student might justly conclude that the misfortune and the misery that plague the
souls of such characters as Mouchette in Sous Ie soleil de Satan, or the priest Cenabre
in L'Imposture, are in substance no different from those that plague Tchen, or Hugo
or Perken. And to a certain extent this judgment is on the surfa<.;e quite correct. For
anguish, whatever its provenance, manifests itself under similar aspects; there is in
it something of despair, something of remorse, an inner void, a seeming fracture of
the personality, and an apparent absurdity in the circumstances of life that either provoke or aggravate this anguish. Yet, it is not so much the external manifestations
of anguish that are of prime importance in this discus/>ion, as the immediate source
from which they spring. The source of existentialist anguish has already been considered. But what is the source of this sentiment in a Christian writer like Bernanos?
The answer very briefly stated is sin-that fracture of the mQral law, either proclaimed in the Decalogue or in the natural law written in the heart of man, that
brings with itself a sense of remorse and a conviction of accountability to a higher
judge. For to a Christian, only sin can engender despair, disgust and ultimate angUish. Free of sin, a man can hopefully bear all things.
The very idea of sin, however, is impossible without belief in a personal God.
The disorders of which the characters in the novels and plays of the atheistic exis19 Sartre, p. 101.
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tentialists are patendy guilty could never in their view be called sin. On the other
hand, the misdeeds of the characters in the novels of Bernanos are truly sinful on
the very admission of the author himself. His whole concept of man in the world
of time is based upon man's acceptance or rejection of grace. But grace in almost
any theology is viewed as an antidote to human weakness and sin. And it was originally St. Augustine, the great Doctor of grace, who first introduced the conflict between sin and grace into literature with the publication of his Confessions. This is
the opinion of Jean Guitton, an impressive authority on St. Augustine; he states:
Yet before St. Augustine the history of personal sin, which is now the
theme of modern tragedy, the gradual invasion of the self by the flesh
usurping in us the role of the spirit and attempting to justify itself, the
adjustment effected between the various parts of the self, the coincidence
of the moment of liberation with that of the most strenuous reSistance,
the fluctuations of the deepest self which refuses, at the last, to identify
itself with the flesh, and which, at the very time when it effects its detachment from the depths of the good-thiS history had, as yet, found
no literary expression. 20
This is the very struggle with which Bernanos fills the pages of his novels. He
is not, like Sartre, content to witness to the anxieties and suffering of modern man
on a purely materialistic level. Although a writer like Sartre has vitally portrayed
the interior struggles of modern man in a succession of vivid experiences, this is
in the final analysis no more than an experience of disintegration. 21 Bernanos,
on the contrary, will seek or at least imply in his novels a tendency toward the need
of an integration in man on a plane manifesdy higher than that which is merely
material. It is here that Bernanos differs baSically from the Existentialists, for he
cherishes a deep hope for integration of personality, not in human power alone but
in the divine. He strongly suggests the method of St. Augustine who in his Confessions held up to the world of his day a mirror of its misery. The dilemma of the
inner division caused by angUish which is so characteristic of man in the modern
novel, even in the Catholic novel, stands clearly revealed in the ConfeSSiOns. For in
its pages we find a soul, probably typical of many of its contemporaries, torn between two allegiances, the one carnal and the other divine. In fact, the fracture of his
personality through sin seemed so real at times to Augustine that he declared:
For I still thought "that it was not we that sin, but that I know not
what other nature sinned in us;" and it delighted my pride, to be free
from blame; and when I had done any evil, not to confess that I had
20 Jean Guitto n, The Modernity of St. Augustine, trans. A: V: Littledale ( Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1959 ),
p. 14.
21 Ibid., p. 35 .
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done any, that Thou mightest heal my soul because it had sinned against
Thee; but I loved to excuse it, and to a ce use I know not what other
thing, which was with me, but which I was not. 22
Guitton furthermore suggests that the influence of Augustine has endured throughout the centuries down to our own times in some of the literature of France. He says:
It is a fact that, with the separation of the East and the eclipse of Greek
culture, Latin theology, derived from St. Augustine, dominated the Middle
Ages, and inspired the Reformers . So from St. Thomas to Malebranche,
from St. Bernard to Jansenius, the history of theology and philosophy
was bound up with the fortunes of Augustinism, just a s if this were a
second tradition mingled with the first, as if it had given, on the threshold
of the new age, a new version of the Christian message. 23
Again, among the examples he cites of the modern novelists who have manifested in
their writings the spirit of Augustine are Francois Mauriac and Georges Bernanos.
After discussing how Sartre, the existentialist, suggests Augustine during the latter's
Manichaean period,24 when the Bishop of Hippo was at a loss to conceive of existence save under the form of matter, Guitton adds:
We might draw other comparisons besides these; some, in fact, suggest
themselves forcibly , as for example, that of the spirit prompting Saint
Augustine with the general tone of the novels of Mauriac or of Bernanos. 25
What is this Augustinian spirit that is supposed to pervade the novels of these
two moderns ? It really consists in the concrete expression of all that intermediate
activity in which a man 's intellect gradually develops and the will comes to life. It
includes the individual recollections, personal happenings and allied particular avenues
of self-knowledge that make up the stuff of the history of a given human being. More
than this, there is also involved in the personal history of a man, the fact of sin.
This did not, for example, exist in writers before the time of Augustine. The Greeks,
for instance, considered sin a mere character weakness which could in no way affect
the wisdom of the superior soul at rest in perfect balance and undisturbed equanimity.
For among the pagans the sense of personal sin was almost non-existent. But in our
day, when as a result of the Christian tradition, the sense of sin is still a vital issue
in many souls, a correspondingly strong tendency to follow a minutely historical
22 ConfesSions of St. Augustine, trans. Edward D. Pusey, D. D. (New York: Random House, 1949 ), p. 88.
23 Guitton, p. 80.
24 Ibid., p. 30.
25 Ib id., p. 34.
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procedure in the novel is the order of the day. Guitton summing up this point says:
Whatever the case may be, the wise man never sins, and could not. So ,
then, there is a mysterious link between the sense of (personal) evil and
the sense of (historical) time; at every period when the sense of evil is
alive, the sense of time is seen to be present. When the sense of evil grows
weak, the sense of historical time, of the irreversible co u r s e of time
marked out by particular events lessens correspondingly. 26
Guitton in analyzing the thought of Augustine on the genesis of the position of sin
in man's misery and anguish, carries the reader back through time to the fall of
Lucifer recounted in the Bible. Here, as Guitton points out, is the beginning of the
unending clash between the love of God and the love of self. He says of this interior
struggle in the heart of man:
It began with the creation of the angels, for Lucifer's revolt preceded
that of Adam; but through the sin of the angel the moral order was
split up into two communions, into "two cities," as St. Augustine says,
of which one has love for its principle and the other self-love, the counterfeit of love. Evil was brought into the world through the warping of the
will. The dichotomy will never come to an end. 27
It is this counterfeit of love, this preference of man to stop at the creature rather than
rise to the love of the Creator that constitutes sin in the mind of Augustine, and which
finds expression in the character developments of Bernanos. It is this same false love
that generates anguish of soul according to both of these men. In the case of Augustine, this anguish of spirit as a result of immoral living is manifest in his Confessions
especially at the pOint in his life when his conversion seems imminent. For example,
his refusal to break with the past despite an inner conviction urging him to do so,
brought disillusionment and mental torture to Augustine. He cries out in prayer
to God:

o crooked

paths! Woe to the audacious soul, which hoped, by foresaking
Thee, to gain some better thing! Turned it hath, and turned again, upon
back, sides, and belly, yet all was painful; and Thou alone rest. 28

Frustration and fear form part of Augustine's anguish as he finds himself powerless
to effect a complete parting with his old ways. This distressing weakness haunts
26 Ib id., p. 13.
27 Ibid., pp. 41-42.

•

28 Confessions o/St. Augustine, p. 117.
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him through the days that witness the final change in his way of living. He confesses:
Thus was I gnawed within, and exceedingly confounded with a horrible
shame, while Pontitianus was so speaking. And he having brought to a
close his tale and the business he came for, went his way; and I unto
myself. What said I not against myself: with what scourges of condemnation lashed I not my soul, that it might follow me, striving to go
after Thee! Yet it drew back; refused, but excused not itself. All arguments
were spent and confuted; there rem a in e d a mute shrinking; and she
feared , as she would death, to be restrained from the flux of that custom, whereby she was wasting to death. 29
As the years go by, Augustine grows tired of trying to make excuses for his license;
and exhausted by the struggle for inner peace, he exclaims:
Thus soul-sick was I, and tormented, accusing myself much more severely
than my wont, rolling and turning me in my chain, till that were wholly
broken, whereby I now was but just, but still was, held. And Thou, 0
Lord , pressedst upon me in my inward parts by a severe mercy, redoubling the lashes of fear and shame, lest I should again give way,
and not bursting that same slight rem a i n in g tie, it should recover
strengh, and bind me the faster . 30
This is reminiscent of the grace that pursues Germaine Malorthy of Sous Ie soleil
de Satan as she rushes headlong to her own destruction. She too is overcome by
shame, disgust and frustration. But all this suffering amounts to a grace to save
her from her love of self as far as Bernanos sees it. Referring to the help proffered
her by Donissan-a help that was not immediately fruitful-Bernanos says:
\

/

De la lumiere qUi l'a percee de part en part-pauvre petit animal obscur
-il ne reste que sa douleur inconnue, dont elle mourrait sans la comprendre. Elle se debat, I 'arme ~blouissante en plein coeur, et la main
qUi I'a poussee ne connalt pas sa cruaute. Pour la divine misericorde,
elle I'ignore et ne saurait meme pas I'imaginer. 31
Unlike so many of the characters portrayed by Bernanos in his novels, Augustine
actually makes use of the grace given him . Under the divine influence his mind perceives clearly and his heart warms with unselfish love as he reads from St. Paul:
29 Ibid., p. 159.
30 Ibid., p. 164.
31 Georges Bernanos, Sous le soleil de Satall ( Paris: Ubrairie Pion, 1926 ), p. 218.
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Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness,
not in strife and envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make
not provision for the flesh, in concupiscence. 32
Augustine has not need, for the moment, to read farther; for acting under the influence of grace he surrenders himself body and soul to the will of God. Later on he
muses over this moment of change and asks with wonderment in his heart:
But where through all those years, and out of what low and deep recess
was my free-will called forth in a moment, whereby to submit my neck
to Thy easy yoke, and my shoulders unto They light burden, 0 Christ
Jesus, my Helper and my Redeemer? 33
Augustine is here invoking very patently the mystery of grace-that divine help that
might have caused him to will what he wanted, or abandoned him in his great struggle, or even failed to make its presence felt when he was ready to sunder the bonds
of his personal iniquity. Hereafter he will underscore the importance of grace to
eliminate frustration and fear, psychoses and despair. For, with Augustine, grace is
the answer to man 's misery; it is the true nemesis of anguish because it is the antidote to sin. But where is it to be found? In God, answers Augustine. But where is
God to be found by groping man? Augustine makes a rejoinder that has become
classic:
Too late loved I Thee, 0 Thou Beauty of ancient days, yet ever new!
too late I love Thee! And behold, Thou wert within, and I abroad, and
there I searched for Thee! deformed I, plunging amid those fair forms
which Thou hadst made. Thou wert with me, but I wa s not with Thee.
Things held me far from Thee, which, unless they were in Thee, were
not at all. Thou calledst, and shoutedst, and burstest my deafness. Thou
flashedst, shonest, and scatteredst my blindness. Thou breathedst odours,
and I drew in breath and pant for Thee. I tasted, and hunger and thirst.
Thou touchedst me, and I burned for Thy peace. 34
So man must, through the intermediary of grace, in the thought of Augustine,
find and cling to God. Through the shambles of his ruinous past and the bruises of
his personal mistakes he must cross over to God by a total surrender. Yet, in this
life, no man is completely perfect spiritually. There will always, therefore, be some

32 Confessions of St. Augustine, p. 167.
33 Ibid., p. 169.
34 Ibid., p. 221.
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misery, some anguish. But man must stay with God; for elsewhere there is no victory. So Augustine concludes:
When I shall with my whole self cleave to Thee, I shall nowhere have
sorrow or labour; and my life shall wholly live, as wholly full of Thee.
But now since whom Thou fillest, Thou liftest up, because I am not full
of Thee I am a burden to myself. Lamentable joys strive with joyous
sorrows; and on which side is the victory, I know not. Woe is me! Lord
have pity on me. Woe is me! lo! I hide not my wounds; Thou art the
Physician, I the sick; Thou merciful, I miserable. Is not the life of man
upon earth all trial. Who wishes for troubles and difficulties? Thou
commandest them to be endured, but to be loved. No man loves what
he endures, though he love to endure. 35
Hence, in the mind of St. Augustine, the cause of human anguish is basically
sin-the deliberate refusal of the service that man owes to God. From this stems man's
remorse, his disquiet of soul, his feeling of being adrift among the other creatures of
the universe, kis sense of frustration, and a certain determination to persevere in his
state of misery instead of attaining to the freedom of spirit of the children of God.
The very same view of the relation between man and his personal miseries is shared
by Bernanos. It is man's drift toward materialism, his abdication of moral responsibility and his forgetfulness of God that account for the unhappiness, the unrest, the
anguish that so characterizes the people of this generation.
The almost ubiquitous presence of angUished persons in the novels of Bernanos
has, in fact, suggested this study. Beginning with his first novel, Sous Ie soleil de
Satan, published in 1926 right down to Monsieur Ouine, the last of his novels, Bernanos has peopled his pages with a wide variety of anguished souls. There are, for
example, Germaine Malworthy, the priest Donissan and Saint-Marin in Sous Ie solei!
de Satan; the priest Cenabre, Pernichon and the saintly priest Chevance in L'Imposture; Chantal de Clergerie, her father and grandmother, the psychiatrist La Perouse
in La joie; surely all the characters almost without exception in Un mauvais r~e;
Evangeline, the counterfeit priest in Un crime; Mouchette in Nouvelle histoire de
Mouchette; the prie~t of Ambricourt, the countess, in Journal d 'un· cure de campagne;
and finally the old man Vendomme and M. Ouine in Monsieur Ouine.
LouiS Chaigne, who has devoted several pages to a study of Bernanos, corroborates this view when he says of the characters that Bernanos describes:
Le mond~ lui apparaft habite par Ie Mal. Le Mal, Ie surprend partout,
dans Ie rictus satisfait d 'un epais materialiste, sur Ie front stigmatise

35 Ibid. pp. 221-22.
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d 'une pauvre Blle, dans la voix et dans I 'attitude d 'un mauvais prare.
II iraverse une veritable vie humaine, peuplee de spectres et de fantames .. . 36
It should not, however, be supposed, as so many casual readers of Bernanos have
done, that he is especially preoccupied with and revels in the portrayal of evil for
its own sake. For Bernanos this is merely a striking means to an important end.
Like Augustine, Bernanos affirms and delineates in great detail the evil that a human
being can actually perpetrate; yet that is not the final chapter in a sinner's story.
For as Bishop Sheen says of St. Augustine:

The escape from frustration and psychoses, despair and fear for St.
Augustine began by realizing that man is the only creature in the world
who has a power of self-transcendence. As the plant could not be taken
up into the higher life of the animal unless it dies of itself, and as the
animal could not live in man unless it surrendered its animal existence,
so too man could not live in God unless in some way he sacrificed that
which kept him from God and accepted from above that organizing principle of divine-human life called grace. Putting together the two equating
separables of human misery and Divine Mercy, he became the great
Doctor of Divine Grace, for he knew grace experimentally, bearing witness to the way that it illumined the blind and cleansed the leper. 37
It is this conviction of Bernanos that links him closely to the great thinker of the
fourth century. He is very conscious of the presence of grace in the universe. Does
not the priest of Ambricourt exclaim as he dies in the impoverished surroundings
of his friend the apostate priest: "Qu 'est-ce que cela fait? Tout est gr~ce."? 38 Bernanos is, in fact, full of patience with and hope for the ultimate redemption of the
hopeless sinners. In this connection one critic writes:
L'oeuvre de Bernanos n'est pas une complainte du p~ch€, du moins si
I'on ne voit dans Ie peche qu'une revolte. Le grand scandale n'est pas
celui d 'une -ame que Ie monde tient pour criminelle; de certains crimes,
il semble au contraire que Bernanos les considhe sinon sans haine, du
moins sans mepris. Mais une 1me qui I a iss e perdre ce qu 'elle avait

36 Louis Chaigne, Vies et oeuvres d 'ecrivains (PariS: Lanore, 1950), p. 104.
37 Fulton
p. Xl.

J.

Sheen, in the introduction to The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. Edward D. Pusey, D. D.,

38 Georges Bernanos,fournal d 'un cur: de campagne (Paris: Librairie Pion, 1936), p. 324.
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d 'unique et d 'essentiel, qUi tend vers Ie neant ou qUi jamais ne fut autre
chose que neant, voila ce qui apparait monstreux Bernanos. Aborde-t-il
un personnage, on dirait qu'il n 'ait plus q u 'un souci, qu 'un besoin: est-ce
une arne vivante, est-ce un mort, cette Mouchette, cet abbe Cenabre, ce
candid at
I 'Academie? Question qUi ne Ie lllchera plus, et qu'il nous
imposera a chaque action, 'a chaque parole de ses heros. Il investit ses
personnages avec une ruse coupee d 'acces de violence; il £laire en eux
ce nhnt, ille stigmatise d'avance; Ie decouvrir, il s'indigne et se rejouit
sombrement; il n'aura de cesse qu'il ne les ait contraints sentir ce neant,
~ l'avouer,
trembler devant leur propre vide - ou qu'il n'ait enfin
,
decouvert, sous maints replis et maintes trompeuses apparences, I'etincelle
qu'y deposa une Gr~ce avare et capricieuse. 39

a

a

a

~

a

a

The great tragedy, then, as Bernanos sees it, is the fact that modern man is
all too willing to sell his spiritual birthright for the proverbial "mess of pottage." 40
How can a person, wonders Bernanos, who is destined for friendship with Divinity
be satisfied to wallow in selfishness and feed on delusion? How can a soul made to
live in a state of grace, which is friendship with God, allow itself to be dispossessed
by the forces of evil and dwell in the intimacy of Satan? It would seem that Bernanos
already in his first novel, Sous Ie soleil de Satan, sounds a warning to his generation, especially to his fellow Catholics, that the Faith will not brook neglect, nor will
it tolerate any half measure in its practice. For Mouchette and Saint-Marin, for example, are people with dead faith; and for them the kingdom of grace is almost
non-existent.
Unlike the Existentialist writers, moreover, Bernanos refuses to allow that events
such as depressions and wars and concentration camps have grown beyond the
capability of man to deal successfully with them; it is rather man who, like the franc,
has depreciated in value. He, therefore, takes to task those modern writers who while
unwilling to blame themselves for their incapacity in the matter of courage and honor,
speak of the rigorous fatalities of history to cover their shame. In La Liberti, pourquOi
faire?, Bernanos says:

a

a

Ils sont de plus endins nier l'histoire, ne voir en elle que l'ensemble
des fatalites historiques. Ceux qui n 'osent pas invoquer franchement Ie
determinisme marxiste-comme les democrates chn!tiens par exempleen appellent aux "aspirations des masses." 41
Yet Bernanos is not a reformer in the pejorative sense of the word. He can
39 Marcel Arland, Essais et nouveaux essais critiques (PariS: Gallimard, Copyright 1952), p. 114.
40 Georges Bernanos, La Liberti, pourquoi /aire?( Paris: Gallimard, Copyright 1953), p. 42.
41 Ibid., p. 32.
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exercise compassion for his neighbor and tries at times to excuse his aberrations.
If modern man suffers anguish, says Bernanos, he is not entirely to blame; for, he
continues, man today, chiefly the citizen of the democracies of the world, theoretically
and supposedly enjoys freedom; yet in most cases, this freedom is merely nominal,
since the citizen must conform to the demands of an economic system that tends more
and more to dictate its own terms . This is, in reality, according to Bernanos, the
power of Technocracy, a system of thought that will in the end swallow up the noblest human activity unless people wake up to its menace. Bernanos calls " imbeciles "
those who support this technocracy with blind enthusiasm; their redemption from its
spirit and baneful effects is, in his opinion, comparable to the supernatural salvation of man from damnation. 42
The very worst feature of economic totalitarianism, says Bernanos, is that it
causes man to forget that he has a soul. This is due in part to all sorts of propaganda, like modern advertising, that concentrate man 's interest and ambitions on
materialistic values to the detriment of the democratic heritage that changed him from
a serf into a free man. In the process, man loses his sense of conscience; and while
he enjoys this false freedom , he sinks slowly into the quagmire of depersonalization
and despair; the secular spirit thus stages its final triumph over religion:
Les ames: On rougit presque d 'ecrire aujourd'hui ce mot sacre. Les m~mes
pretres imposteurs diront qu 'aucune force au monde ne saurait avoir
raison des ames. Je ne pretends pas que la Machine a bouger les cranes
est cap abies de debourrer les ~mes, ou de vider un homme de son ~me,
comme une cuisiniere vide un lapin. J e crois seulement qu 'un homme
peut tres bien garder une lime et ne pas le sentir, n'en etre nullement
incommode; cela se voit, helas, tous les jours. L'homme n 'a de contact
avec son arne que par la vie interieure, et dans la Civilisation des Machines la vie interieure prend peu a peu un caractere anormal. Pour des
millions d'imbeciles, elle n 'est qu 'un synonyme vulgaire de la vie subconsciente, et le subconscient doit rester sous le controle du psychiatre.
Oh! sans doute, le psychiatre ne saurait etre tenu pour responsable de
cette betise, mais il ne peut pas non plus faire grand chose contre elle.
La Civilisation des Machines qui exploite le travail desinteresse du savant
est moins ten tee que jamais de lui d~lt~guer la plus petite part de son
magisthe sur les consciences. 43
Personal happiness and liberty of spirit, then, are not a matter for the psychiatrist;
it is a question of the action of grace on the innermost fabric of a man 's soul. This
is perhaps why Bernanos fulminates at every opportunity he can find against the
42 Georges Bernanos, La France conire les ro bots (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1947), p. 201.
43 Ibid., pp. 217-18.
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psychiatrist in his various novels. He cannot tolerate this " plumber of souls" to move
into the sacred precincts of a man's soul. He has the psychiatrist La Perouse confess
to Chantel de Clergerie that there is nothing more inane than a man who gives vent
to his curiosity by invading the souls of others. He says:

-Ii y a plus b~te et plus cruel encore, fit M. de La Perouse, c'est celui
que j'appelle l'amateur d'ames, Ie Maniaque qUi vous attribue une conscience pour avoir Ie plaisir de descendre dedans, d 'y apporter son propre
mobilier ... Chacun de nous s'arrange avec sa part de verite et de mensonge . . . MOi-me'me. 44
This is perhaps, again, precisely the great malice of Bernanos ' last romanesque creation, M. Ouine. Despite a whole lifetime of acting according to his own whims and
satisfying an insatiable curiosity, Ouine who has thoroughly ignored the voice of
conscience cannot in the final analysis stifle it; " the worm" will gnaw on and on to
the very last moment of his life. 45 And in the end, his soul, which according to
Bernanos is the sine qua non of the interior life and of eternal values, swallows up
the dissipated consciousness of the old man-that rich skein of finally unrequited desires that took a whole lifetime to weave. In the last analysis, every man must enter
into himself, Bernanos seems to say; and the experience is a horrowing one. Just
before his last breath, Ouine says to the young Steeny:
Je viens de passer un sacn: moment, fit-il avec un e'norme soupir. Rentrer
en soi-meme n'est pas un jeu, mon gar~on. Ii ne m'en aurait pas plus
coute de rentrer dans Ie ventre qUi m'a fait, je me suis retourne, positivement, j'ai fait de mon envers I'endro it, je me suis retourne comme
un gant. 46
Thus the Catholic literary writers are insistent to point out that this is the angUish that comes to man when through his own or another's fault he cuts away
from himself the grace of God which is the true life of the soul and the condition
for man's happiness. For whoever perseveres in this rejection of God remains an
enemy to His works; and these works in turn-the en-soi-that were meant to be an
avenue to God become an " absurd " meaningless jumble.

Co nclusion
The anguish that besets the hearts and minds of countless thousands of people the
world over is a phenomenon that has captured the attention of some of the fore44 Georges Bernanos, LaJoie (PariS: Librairie Pion, 1929 ), p. 219.
45 Georges Bernanos, Monsieu r OUine (Paris: Librairie Pion, 1946), p. 145.
46 Ib id, p. 244.
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most writers and thinkers of the last forty years. The French, through the publications of Jean-Paul Sartre before, during and after World War II, called particular
attention to the problem of the moderri anguished man who has suffered the attack
of a "hostile" and" absurd" universe. The profeSSions of Sartre were not a surprise
to readers of French novels and drama since they had been gradually prepared for
them by the very untraditional novels of men like Malraux, Camus and Andre Gide
who concentrated their talent to exposing the problem of individual liberty in a highly
complex and hostile world. Most of these authors have existential dimensions in their
writing; and most of them do point up the "absurd" universe in which man works
out his destiny. These writers fairly well agree that man must strive and suffer and
experience contradiction to arrive at a tolerable human condition. Their efforts to
succeed ultimately bring them in contact with an absolute that is their reward. This
absolute has the nature of a brief perception that allows the writer to possess his
particular destiny, to take a "hold on the infinite," to transcend material things the en-soi of the Existentialist-and to contemplate the grandeur of their own spiritual
dignity as men. This consolation, however, is fleeting and fugitive; death is the great
harvester of all human striving, the silencer of human agitation, yet at the same
time the measure of life's values.
The French Catholic contemporaries of the Atheistic Existentialist men of letters
take up the same problems as their opponents but emerge with a different answer. Their
efforts are not all horizontal; they open doors and windows on the Supernatural
Infinite. Man's misery is a reality, they admit; yet he alone is the cause of his own
anguish. For anguish comes as a result of personal sin and in the tradition of St.
Augustine, they show how man perpetrates evil and his own doom, but that God is
ever at hand with divine grace to supply an antidote to this misfortune. Once man
attains to a state of grace, the whole en-soi becomes a further source of help; for
God's friends use things-in-themselves to do God's will and promote His glory. Hence,
the priest of Ambricourt in Journal d'un Cure de Campagne could before dying say
with deep conviction: "Tout est gr~ce." For the Christian writers on anguish, death
is not only a stimulant to good, but the beginning of an ecstatic life without end.
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